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Abstract
We consider voting correspondences that are, besides Condorcet Consis-
tent, immune against the two strong no show paradoxes. That is, it
cannot happen that if an additional voter ranks a winning alternative on
top then that alternative becomes loosing, and that if an additional voter
ranks a loosing alternative at bottom then that alternative becomes win-
ning. This immunity is called the Top Property in the first case and the
Bottom Property in the second case. We establish the voting correspon-
dence satisfying Condorcet Consistency and the Top Property, which is
maximal in the following strong sense: it is the union of all smaller voting
correspondences with these two properties. The result remains true if we
add the Bottom Property but not if we replace the Top Property by the
Bottom Property. This voting correspondence contains the Minimax Rule
but it is strictly larger. In particular, voting functions (single-valued vot-
ing correspondences) that are Condorcet Consistent and immune against
the two paradoxes must select from this maximal correspondence, and we
demonstrate several ways in which this can or cannot be done.
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1 Introduction
Within a democratic voting system it should be in the own interest of voters not
to abstain from voting. Abstaining from voting, however, can be rational even in
voting systems that are often regarded as truly democratic. A recent example is
the Dutch referendum for the EU Association Treaty with the Ukraine on April
6, 2016. A majority voted against this treaty, but the total voter turnout was
hardly more than 2% above the minimally required 30%: if some of the ‘yes’
voters would have stayed at home then the referendum would have been invalid
and the ‘no’ to the treaty avoided.
Another natural and desirable property of a voting system is Condorcet
Consistency (de Condorcet, 1785): if there is an alternative (candidate, political
party, law, etc.) that is ranked above any other alternative by some majority of
the voters, then that alternative should be chosen. Also this property is often not
fulfilled. Again in The Netherlands, van Deemen and Vergunst (1998) provide
evidence that D66 (a progressive liberal party) may have been the Condorcet
winner in several consecutive Dutch elections for Parliament, but it never won
those elections and, consequently, could never take the lead in the formation of
a new government.
In this paper we study voting correspondences which are Condorcet Consis-
tent and which do not admit situations where ranking one’s favorite alternative
first may turn this alternative from a winner into a looser, or ranking one’s
least favorite alternative last may turn this from a looser into a winner – in the
two-alternative referendum on the Ukraine Association treaty mentioned above
both these situations occurred. In Nurmi (2002) and Pe´rez (2001) these phe-
nomena are referred to as the positive and negative strong no show paradoxes,
respectively. Recently, Felsenthal and Nurmi (2016) investigated a number of
well-known Condorcet Consistent voting correspondences with respect to the
occurrence of these two paradoxes. They find that the Minimax Rule rules out
both. The Minimax Rule chooses those alternatives for which a minimal number
of voters rank some other alternative higher.
We call the avoidance of these paradoxes the Top Property and the Bottom
Property, respectively. Thus, the Top Property says that if an additional voter
ranks a winning alternative on top then that alternative remains winning, and
the Bottom Property says that if an additional voter ranks a loosing alternative
at bottom then that alternative remains loosing. As one of the main results
in the paper we establish the maximal Condorcet Consistent voting correspon-
dence H that satisfies the Top Property, that is: each Condorcet Consistent
voting correspondence satisfying the Top Property must be contained in H
and, a fortiori, H is the union of all smaller voting correspondences with the
two properties. We also show that this result remains true if we add the Bot-
tom Property, but not if we replace the Top Property by the Bottom Property.
The Minimax Rule in particular is contained in H. Furthermore, we show that
also voting functions (single-valued or resolute voting correspondences) that are
Condorcet Consistent (i.e., they choose a Condorcet winner if there is one) and
rule out both paradoxes must select from H, and we exhibit several ways in
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which this can or cannot be done.
Moulin (1988) shows that if there are at least four alternatives and at least
twenty-five voters, no Condorcet Consistent voting function can satisfy a condi-
tion called ‘participation’: this condition requires that no voter can be worse off
by voting than by abstention. The participation condition rules out the no show
paradox as formulated in Brams and Fishburn (1983). This no show paradox is
weaker (hence, occurs more often) than the combination of the two strong ver-
sions that we consider and, consequently, the participation condition in Moulin
(1988) is stronger than the combination of the Top Property and the Bottom
Property. See also Jimeno et al (2009), Brandt et al (2017), and Nu´n˜ez and
Sanver (2017) for extensions and strengthenings of the results in Moulin (1988)
on the (weak) no show paradox; and Felsenthal and Tideman (2013) and Duddy
(2014) on the strong no show paradoxes. In particular, Duddy (2014) allows
weak preference rankings and shows that then every Condorcet consistent vot-
ing function must exhibit both paradoxes if there are at least four alternatives.
We consider linear orderings, that is, strict rankings.
In Section 2 of the paper we provide basic concepts and definitions, and
in Section 3 we consider voting correspondences. Our main result is Corollary
3.8, which states that the correspondence H alluded to above is the maximal
voting correspondence that is Condorcet Consistent and satisfies both the Top
Property and Bottom Property. In Section 4 we consider voting functions with
these properties, which are necessarily selections from H. We may, in particular,
choose from the Minimax Rule according to a fixed tie-breaking ordering, but
this result does not extend to H. Section 5 concludes. Some of the proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 Basic definitions
We let A denote the finite set of alternatives. The set of potential voters is N. A
ranking is a linear ordering (reflexive, complete, transitive, and antisymmetric)
over A, and L denotes the set of rankings. For a finite set N ⊆ N, RN =
(Ri)i∈N ∈ LN is called a profile. For j ∈ N \N and Rj ∈ L we typically denote
by (RN , Rj) a profile where each i ∈ N has ranking Ri and j has ranking Rj .
Also, for R′ ∈ L, (RN , R′) denotes a profile for N and an additional voter with
ranking R′. For a ranking R we denote by t(R) its top alternative and by b(R)
its bottom alternative, that is, t(R)RxR b(R) for all x ∈ A.
For two distinct alternatives x and y,
nxy(RN ) = |{i ∈ N : xRiy}| − |{i ∈ N : yRix}|
denotes the net number of voters ranking x over y. Clearly, nxy(RN ) = −nyx(RN ).
The number
mx(RN ) = max
y∈A\{x}
nyx(RN )
is called the (maximal) resistance against x. Note that nxy(RN ) and mx(RN )
have the same parity (odd or even) as |N |.
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An alternative x is a (weak) Condorcet winner at RN if mx(RN ) ≤ 0 or,
equivalently, nxy(RN ) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ A \ {x}. The (possibly empty) set of
Condorcet winners is denoted by C(RN ), hence
C(RN ) = {x ∈ A : mx(RN ) ≤ 0}.
Remark 2.1. Clearly, if mx(RN ) < 0 for some x ∈ A, then nyx(RN ) < 0 for
all y ∈ A\{x}, which in turn implies nxy(RN ) > 0 and thus my(RN ) > 0 for all
y ∈ A \ {x}. Therefore, C(RN ) = {x}. In this case, x is the unique Condorcet
winner, usually called the strong Condorcet winner.
A voting correspondence C assigns to each profile RN a nonempty subset
C(RN ) of A, and a voting function F assigns to each profile RN an alternative
F (RN ) ∈ A. If F (RN ) ∈ C(RN ) for each profile RN , then we call (voting
function) F a selection from (voting correspondence) C.
3 Condorcet Consistency, Top Property, and Bot-
tom Property for voting correspondences
Let C be a voting correspondence. The following properties are of central in-
terest in this paper.
Condorcet Consistency (CC) For every profile RN such that C(RN ) 6= ∅,
C(RN ) = C(RN ).
Top Property (TP) For every profile RN , every j ∈ N \N , every x ∈ A, and
every Rj with t(Rj) = x, if x ∈ C(RN ), then x ∈ C(RN , Rj).
Bottom Property (BP) For every profile RN , every j ∈ N \N , every x ∈ A,
and every Rj with b(Rj) = x, if x /∈ C(RN ), then x /∈ C(RN , Rj).
Condorcet Consistency says that if there exist Condorcet winners, then ex-
actly those should be chosen. The two other properties guarantee that the
following two situations cannot occur. First, if x is chosen and an additional
voter ranks x at top, then x is no longer chosen; second, if x is not chosen and
an additional voter ranks x at bottom, then x is chosen. Thus, in theses cases,
the additional voter would be better off by abstention. The Top Property and
the Bottom Property prevent exactly these so-called strong no show paradoxes.
Remark 3.1. The requirement of Condorcet Consistency can be subject to
discussion in some situations. Suppose, of 99 voters, 50 rank a on top, b second,
and all other candidates below a and b. The remaining 49 voters rank b on
top and a last. Then a is the (unique, strong) Condorcet winner but one could
argue that b is a much better compromise.
A main goal of this paper is to investigate which voting correspondences
satisfy all three properties. A first result concerns the Minimax Rule, which
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dates back to Black (1958), Simpson (1969), and Kramer (1977). The Minimax
Rule M is defined by
M(RN ) = {x ∈ A : mx(RN ) ≤ my(RN ) for all y ∈ A},
hence it chooses those alternatives against wich resistance is minimal.
The following result is already known (e.g., Felsenthal and Nurmi, 2016;
Felsenthal and Tideman, 2013; and Pe´rez, 2001), but for completeness we pro-
vide a proof in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.2. M satisfies CC, TP, and BP.
Until further notice we concentrate on CC and TP, and investigate if it is
possible to choose alternatives additional to those in M without violating TP.
The following example may be instructive.
Example 3.3. Let A = {a, b, c} and consider the 10-voter profile RN given by
3 3 4
a b c
b c a
c a b
where the first column indicates that three voters have ranking R with aRbRc,
also denoted as R = abc; etc. The table of pairwise comparisons is
a b c
a − 7 3
b 3 − 6
c 7 4 −
For instance, the number 7 in row a and column b means that seven voters rank
a above b. Hence nab(RN ) = 7 − 3 = 4, nac(RN ) = −4, and nbc(RN ) = 2.
Then ma(RN ) = mb(RN ) = 4 and mc(RN ) = 2, so that C(RN ) = ∅ and
M(RN ) = {c}.
Could we, additionally to c, also choose a? If we add two voters who rank a
on top and c second, then c becomes a Condorcet winner, but not a:
3 3 4 2
a b c a
b c a c
c a b b
a b c
a − 9 5
b 3 − 6
c 7 6 −
Now CC requires c to be chosen uniquely, and this violates TP since a is no
longer chosen.
This cannot happen if b is chosen additionally to c, since adding rankings
with b on top will imply that b keeps on beating c by majority, so that c cannot
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become a Condorcet winner. Indeed, adding (e.g.) four voters with ranking bac
to the original profile results in:
3 3 4 4
a b c b
b c a a
c a b c
a b c
a − 7 7
b 7 − 10
c 7 4 −
so that a and b are both Condorcet winners, and b remains to be chosen.
What we learn from this example is the following. If x and y are alterna-
tives and, at some profile RN without Condorcet winners, we have my(RN ) <
mx(RN ), then choosing x and adding rankings with x on top and (as worst case)
y second may cause y to become a Condorcet winner before x, unless already
at RN , x has sufficient support against y: we need that nxy(RN ) > −my(RN ),
since then y can never become a Condorcet winner by adding rankings with
x on top. This condition is equivalent to the condition nyx(RN ) < my(RN ).
Indeed, one can indeed easily check that in Example 3.3 the inequality holds for
x = b and y = c but not for x = a and y = c.
These considerations lead to the following definition.
Definition 3.4. The voting correspondence H is defined by
H(RN ) = {x ∈ A : [my(RN ) < mx(RN )⇒ nyx(RN ) < my(RN )] for all y ∈ A}
for every profile RN .
Clearly, the implication in the definition of H is trivially satisfied for alterna-
tives x against which resistance mx(RN ) is minimal, hence M(RN ) ⊆ H(RN ).
We first prove the following result.
Proposition 3.5. H satisfies CC and TP.
Proof. First, we show that H satisfies CC. Let RN ∈ LN such that C(RN ) 6=
∅. Then C(RN ) = M(RN ) ⊆ H(RN ). Suppose that x ∈ A \ C(RN ). Take
y ∈ C(RN ). Then my(RN ) ≤ 0 < mx(RN ). Hence nxy(RN ) ≤ 0, which is
equivalent to nyx(RN ) ≥ 0. Thus, nyx(RN ) ≥ my(RN ), so that x 6∈ H(RN ).
Next we show that H satisfies TP. Let RN be a profile and x ∈ A with
x ∈ H(RN ). Let R′ ∈ L with t(R′) = x. First, if C(RN ) 6= ∅, then H(RN ) =
C(RN ) = M(RN ) by the first part of the proof. Then, by Proposition 3.2, x ∈
M(RN , R′), hence x ∈ H(RN , R′) and TP is satisfied. Second, if C(RN ) = ∅,
then suppose there is y ∈ A with my(RN , R′) < mx(RN , R′). We have to show
that nyx(RN , R′) < my(RN , R′). If my(RN ) < mx(RN ) then nyx(RN , R′) =
nyx(RN ) − 1 < my(RN ) − 1 ≤ my(RN , R′), where the strict inequality follows
since x ∈ H(RN ). If my(RN ) ≥ mx(RN ) then mx(RN , R′) > my(RN , R′) ≥
my(RN )− 1 ≥ mx(RN )− 1 = mx(RN , R′), a contradiction, so this case cannot
occur. ¤
Now we show thatH not only satisfies CC and TP but is, moreover, the max-
imal voting correspondence satisfying these conditions, in the following sense.
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Proposition 3.6. Let C be a voting correspondence satisfying CC and TP.
Then C(RN ) ⊆ H(RN ) for every RN ∈ LN .
Proof. Let RN ∈ LN and suppose that for some x ∈ A we have x ∈ C(RN ) \
H(RN ). We derive a contradiction. Since x /∈ H(RN ), there is a y ∈ A
such that my(RN ) < mx(RN ) and nyx(RN ) ≥ my(RN ). By CC of C and H
we must have my(RN ) > 0. Hence, nyx(RN ) > 0. Equivalently, nxy < 0,
which implies that my(RN ) = nx˜y(RN ) for some x˜ ∈ A \ {x}, i.e., x does not
have the maximal resistance against y at the profile RN . Let R′ ∈ L such
that xR′yR′z for all z ∈ A \ {x, y}. Then mx(RN , R′) = mx(RN ) − 1 and
my(RN , R′) = my(RN ) − 1. Thus, we still have my(RN , R′) < mx(RN , R′),
and nyx(RN , R′) = nyx(RN ) − 1 ≥ my(RN ) − 1 = my(RN , R′). Therefore,
if we keep on adding the ranking R′, then nyx(RN , R′, . . . , R′) decreases but
still nyx(RN , R′, . . . , R′) ≥ my(RN , R′, . . . , R′). Hence, after adding my(RN )
rankings R′ we have my(RN , R′, . . . , R′) = 0 while mx(RN , R′, . . . , R′) >
my(RN , R′, . . . , R′). Then by CC, y ∈ C(RN , R′, . . . , R′) and x /∈ C(RN , R′,
. . . , R′). This violates TP of C. ¤
Moreover, it turns out that H also prevents the other no show paradox that
we consider in this paper.
Proposition 3.7. H satisfies BP.
Proof. Let RN ∈ LN , R′ ∈ L with b(R′) = x, and suppose that x ∈ H(RN , R′)
with b(R′) = x. We show that x ∈ H(RN ). Since x ∈ H(RN , R′), for all
y ∈ A with my(RN , R′) < mx(RN , R′) we have nyx(RN , R′) < my(RN , R′),
hence nyx(RN ) + 1 < my(RN , R′). This implies nyx(RN ) < my(RN , R′)− 1 ≤
my(RN ) + 1− 1 = my(RN ). Hence, x ∈ H(RN ). ¤
For voting correspondences C and C ′ we write C ⊆ C ′ if C(RN ) ⊆ C ′(RN )
for every profile RN and C  C ′ if C ⊆ C ′ and there is a profile RN for which
C(RN )  C ′(RN ). Combining the last two propositions we obtain the following.
Corollary 3.8. C ⊆ H for all voting correspondences C satisfying CC, TP,
and BP.
In words, H is the maximal voting correspondence that is Condorcet Consis-
tent and avoids the two strong no show paradoxes, i.e., satisfies properties BP
and TP, in the sense that it contains every other voting correspondence with
these three properties. By using the following lemma we can even strengthen
this result. For every a ∈ A, define the voting correspondence Ca by
Ca(RN ) =
{
M(RN ) if a /∈ H(RN )
M(RN ) ∪ {a} if a ∈ H(RN )
for every RN ∈ LN .
Lemma 3.9. For every a ∈ A, Ca satisfies CC, TP, and BP.
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Proof. Let a ∈ A and RN ∈ LN .
If C(RN ) 6= ∅ then H(RN ) =M(RN ) = C(RN ) by Propositions 3.2 and 3.5,
hence Ca(RN ) = C(RN ). This shows CC of Ca.
Let x ∈ Ca(RN ) and R′ ∈ L with t(R′) = x. If x ∈ M(RN ) then x ∈
M(RN , R′) by Proposition 3.2, hence x ∈ Ca(RN , R′). If a ∈ H(RN ) and
x = a, then x = a ∈ H(RN , R′) by Proposition 3.5, hence x ∈ Ca(RN , R′).
Hence, Ca satisfies TP.
Finally, suppose y ∈ A and y /∈ Ca(RN ), and let R˜ ∈ L with y = b(R˜). Since
y /∈ M(RN ), we have that y /∈ M(RN , R˜) by Proposition 3.2. If If y 6= a then
y /∈ Ca(RN , R′). If y = a then a /∈ H(RN ) and therefore y = a /∈ H(RN , R˜) by
Proposition 3.7, so that again y /∈ Ca(RN , R′). Hence, Ca satisfies BP. ¤
Corollary 3.8 and Lemma 3.9 imply that H is the union of all voting corre-
spondences C 6= H satisfying CC, TP, and BP. Thus, there is no strict subcor-
respondence of H that contains all voting correspondences, unequal to H, with
these three properties.
Corollary 3.10. There is no voting correspondence H ′  H such that C ⊆ H ′
for all voting correspondences C 6= H that satisfy CC, TP, and BP.
From Corollary 3.8 we can drop BP but not TP. In other words, there are
voting correspondences satisfying CC and BP which are not subcorrespondences
of H. An example is the following.
Example 3.11. For a profile RN ∈ LN and an alternative x ∈ A let ηx denote
the minimum number of voters that have to be removed from the profile in order
to make x a Condorcet winner, hence
ηx(RN ) = argmin{|N ′| : N ′  N and x ∈ C(RN\N ′)}.
Define the voting correspondence Y (cf. Young, 1977) by
Y (RN ) = {x ∈ A : ηx(RN ) ≤ ηy(RN ) for all y ∈ A}
for all RN ∈ LN . Clearly, since for each x ∈ A we have ηx(RN ) = 0 if and only
if x ∈ C(RN ), Y is Condorcet Consistent. To show that Y satisfies BP, suppose
that RN ∈ LN and x ∈ A such that x /∈ Y (RN ). Let y ∈ A with ηy(RN ) <
ηx(RN ), and let R′ ∈ L with b(R′) = x. Then ηx(RN , R′) = ηx(RN ) + 1,
and therefore ηy(RN , R′) ≤ ηy(RN ) + 1 < ηx(RN ) + 1 = ηx(RN , R′). Hence,
x /∈ Y (RN , R′).
In order to show that Y is not a subcorrespondence of H, we borrow the
following profile RN with 39 voters and 5 alternatives from Felsenthal and Nurmi
(2016):
11 10 10 2 2 2 1 1
b e a e e c d a
a c c c d b c b
d b d d c a b d
e d b b b d a e
c a e a a e e c
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It is not hard to show that ηa(RN ) = 17, ηb(RN ) = 15, ηc(RN ) = 13, ηd(RN ) =
16, and ηe(RN ) = 11, so that Y (RN ) = {e}. However, md(RN ) = 9 <
me(RN ) = 11 but nde(RN ) = 9 6< md(RN ), so that e /∈ H(RN ). By Proposition
3.6 this implies that Y does not satisfy TP, a fact also shown by Felsenthal and
Nurmi (2016) and Pe´rez (2001).
4 Condorcet Consistency, Top Property, and Bot-
tom Property for voting functions
A voting function F can be identified with a single-valued voting correspon-
dence. The definitions of the Top Property and the Bottom Property therefore
follow from those for a voting correspondence. The adapted definition of Con-
dorcet Consistency is as follows.
Condorcet Consistency (CC) For every profile RN such that C(RN ) 6= ∅,
F (RN ) ∈ C(RN ).
We start with the following result, which still needs a proof, due to the
adapted definition of CC. This proof, however, is a minor modification of the
proof of Proposition 3.6, and for completeness provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 4.1. Let voting function F satisfy CC and TP. Then F is a
selection from H.
Thus, for a voting function to be Condorcet Consistent and satisfy the Top
Property, it has to select from H, and the question arises how this can be done.1
It cannot be done arbitrarily, as the following example shows.
Example 4.2. Consider the 10-voter profile RN given by
3 3 4
a b c
b c a
c a b
of Example 3.3. Then H(RN ) = {b, c}. Suppose that F (RN ) = b. Adding a
voter with ranking R′ = bac results in the following 11-voter profile (RN , R′):
3 3 4 1
a b c b
b c a a
c a b c
Now ma(RN , R′) = mb(RN , R′) = mc(RN , R′) = 3, so that H(RN , R′) =
{a, b, c}. However, if we wish F to satisfy TP, we must have F (RN , R′) = b.
1Clearly, Proposition 4.1 remains true if we add BP, but not if we replace TP by BP. For
instance, we may select from Y in Example 3.11 without always selecting from H.
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A general characterization of all selections from H that satisfy CC and TP
and/or BP is yet out of reach. However, we will exhibit some possibilities and
impossibilities in the remainder of this section.
4.1 Selecting independently
We discuss selections from H that are independent of the underlying rankings
and only depend on the alternatives chosen by H. More precisely, we consider
the following property for a selection F from a correspondence C.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) For all profiles RN ∈ LN
and QM ∈ LM , if C(QM ) ⊆ C(RN ) and F (RN ) ∈ C(QM ), then F (QM ) =
F (RN ).
If this condition is satisfied, then we say that F satisfies IIA with respect to
C.2
Call a voting correspondence C surjective if for every ∅ 6= B ⊆ A there is a
profile RN such that C(RN ) = B. We now have the following characterization
of IIA – see the Appendix for the proof.3
Proposition 4.3. Let voting correspondence C be surjective and let voting func-
tion F be a selection from C. Then F satisfies IIA with respect to C if and only
if there is a Q ∈ L such that F (RN )Qx for all x ∈ C(RN ).
In other words, IIA is equivalent to choosing according to a fixed ranking
Q if the voting correspondence is surjective. The latter is true for any voting
correspondence that is Condorcet Consistent:
Lemma 4.4. Let voting correspondence C satisfy CC. Then C is surjective.
Proof. Let ∅ 6= B = {x1, . . . , xk} ⊆ A. Let R1, R2 ∈ L such that x1R1 . . . R1xk
R1x and xkR2 . . . R2x1R2x for all x ∈ A \ B. Then C(R1, R2) = B, so that
C(R1, R2) = B by CC of C. ¤
Remark 4.5. Note that we could have used a profile with any even number of
voters in the proof Lemma 4.4. For an odd number of voters, however, it is not
difficult to see that a Condorcet winner, if it exists, is unique and strong, since
the resistance against any alternative is also odd in that case (cf. Remark 2.1).
Our first result about voting functions satisfying CC, TP and BP is as fol-
lows.
Proposition 4.6. Every selection F from M that satisfies IIA with respect to
M , satisfies TP and BP .
2IIA is the name usually employed for Assumption 7 in Nash (1950).
3IIA is equivalent to the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, and Proposition 4.3 is a
familiar result stating that F can be rationalized by a linear ordering.
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Proof. Let F be a selection from M satisfying IIA with respect to M .
First, we show that F satisfies TP. Let RN ∈ LN , x = F (RN ), and R′ ∈ L
with t(R′) = x. By IIA of F with respect to M , it is sufficient to show that
M(RN , R′) ⊆ M(RN ) and x ∈ M(RN , R′). Let y ∈ A with y /∈ M(RN ). Then
my(RN ) > mx(RN ). Hence my(RN , R′) ≥ my(RN ) − 1 > mx(RN ) − 1 =
mx(RN , R′), so that y /∈M(RN , R′). Thus, M(RN , R′) ⊆M(RN ). Further, for
every z ∈ A, mx(RN , R′) = mx(RN )− 1 ≤ mz(RN )− 1 ≤ mz(RN , R′), so that
x ∈M(RN , R′).
Second, we show that F satisfies BP. Suppose that RN ∈ LN and x ∈ A
and F (RN ) 6= x. Then M(RN ) \ {x} 6= ∅. Let R′ ∈ L such that b(R′) = x. We
show that F (RN , R′) 6= x. For all y ∈M(RN ) \ {x} we have
mx(RN , R′) = mx(RN ) + 1 ≥ my(RN ) + 1 ≥ my(RN , R′). (1)
If x /∈ M(RN ), then the first inequality in (1) is strict, hence x /∈ M(RN , R′),
and in that case F (RN , R′) 6= x. If x ∈M(RN )∩M(RN , R′) then all inequalities
in (1) are equalities, implying M(RN ) ⊆M(RN , R′), so that F (RN , R′) 6= x by
IIA. ¤
Thus, selections from the Minimax Rule according to a fixed ranking (cf.
Lemma 4.4 and Proposition 4.3) prevent both no show paradoxes considered in
this paper. It turns out, however, that – if there are at least three alternatives
– we cannot select independently from H and still have TP or BP.
Proposition 4.7. Let |A| ≥ 3 and let voting function F be a selection from H
that satisfies IIA with respect to H. Then F does not satisfy TP and F does
not satisfy BP.
Proof. By Lemma 4.4 and Proposition 4.3 there is a ranking Q ∈ L such that
F (RN )Qx for all x ∈ H(RN ), for every profile RN . Let Q = abc . . . for some
a, b, c ∈ A and consider the following 10-voter profile RN , similar to the one in
Example 3.3:
3 3 4
a b c
b c a
c a b
...
...
...
Then H(RN ) = {b, c}. Adding a voter with ranking R′ = bac . . . results in the
profile (RN , R′) given by
3 3 4 1
a b c b
b c a a
c a b c
...
...
...
...
with H(RN , R′) = {a, b, c} and thus F (RN , R′) = a, violating TP.
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To exhibit a violation of BP, consider the 10-voter profile R˜N given by
3 3 4
c a b
a b c
b c a
...
...
...
so that H(R˜N ) = {a, b} and F (R˜N ) = a. Adding a voter with ranking Rˇ =
ca . . . b results in the profile (R˜N , Rˇ) given by
3 3 4 1
c a b c
a b c a
b c a
...
...
...
... b
so that H(R˜N , Rˇ) = {b, c} and F (R˜N , Rˇ) = b, a violation of BP since b =
b(Rˇ). ¤
4.2 Non-independent selections
According to Proposition 4.6, independent (IIA) selections from M satisfy TP
and BP. We now provide examples of selections from M that satisfy TP but
not BP, and conversely. Consequently, those selections cannot be achieved by
maximizing according to a fixed ranking. (See the Appendix for the proofs of
the claims in this subsection.)
Example 4.8. Define the voting correspondence M¯ by
M¯(RN ) = {x ∈M(RN ) : |{i ∈ N : b(Ri) = x}|
≤ |{i ∈ N : b(Ri) = y}| for all y ∈M(RN )}
for every profile RN . Hence M¯(RN ) contains those alternatives from M(RN )
that are ranked last by a minimal number of voters. We fix a ranking Q ∈ L
and define the selection F¯ from M¯ such that, for every profile RN , F¯ (RN )Qy
for all y ∈ M¯(RN ) if |N | is even, and yQF¯ (RN ) for all y ∈ M¯(RN ) if |N | is
odd. Then F¯ satisfies BP but not TP.
Example 4.9. Define the voting correspondence Mˇ by
Mˇ(RN ) = {x ∈M(RN ) : |{i ∈ N : b(Ri) = x}|
≥ |{i ∈ N : b(Ri) = y}| for all y ∈M(RN )}
for every profile RN . Fix a ranking Q ∈ L and define the selection Fˇ from Mˇ
such that, for every profile RN , Fˇ (RN )Qy for all y ∈ Mˇ(RN ). Then Fˇ satisfies
TP but not BP.
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Proposition 4.7 states that independent selections from H cannot satisfy
TP or BP. Nevertheless, there exist selections from H that are not selections
from M and that satisfy TP and BP; TP but not BP; or BP but not TP. The
following examples show this. (The proofs are in the Appendix.)
Example 4.10. Let A = {a, b, c}, consider again the first profile given in Ex-
ample 3.3:
3 3 4
a b c
b c a
c a b
and call this profile R∗. Let Q = bac ∈ L and for every profile RN 6= R∗ define
F (RN ) ∈ M(RN ) such that F (RN )Qx for all x ∈ M(RN ) \ {F (RN )}; and let
F (R∗) = b ∈ H(R∗) = {b, c}. Note that b /∈ {c} =M(R∗). This voting function
F satisfies both TP and BP.
Example 4.11. Let A = {a, b, c}, consider again the profile R∗ of Example
4.10, let now Q = bca ∈ L, and define F as in Example 4.10, now using this Q.
Then F satisfies TP but not BP.
Example 4.12. Let A = {a, b, c}, consider again the profile R∗ of Example
4.10, and let now Q = cab ∈ L. Define F¯ (RN ) as in Example 4.8 for every
profile RN 6= R∗, and let F (R∗) = b. Then F¯ satisfies BP but not TP.
5 Concluding remarks
We have provided a necessary condition for a voting correspondence to satisfy
Condorcet Consistency while at the same time ruling out the two strong no
show paradoxes, namely that it should be a subcorrespondence of H. The basic
idea leading to the definition of H is that by adding additional voters Condorcet
winners may pop up expelling existing winners – the condition defining H rules
out exactly this. A remaining problem is to find sufficient conditions for voting
correspondences to satisfy these properties. Also, the construction of all selec-
tions from H, i.e., voting functions, that choose a Condorcet winner if there is
one and rule out the strong no show paradoxes, is an open problem.
A Remaining proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.2. If C(RN ) 6= ∅ for some profile RN , then by Remark
2.1 either there is a unique alternative x with mx(RN ) < 0, in which case
M(RN ) = C(RN ) = {x}, or C(RN ) = {x ∈ A : mx(RN ) = 0}, in which case
M(RN ) = C(RN ) = {x ∈ A : mx(RN ) = 0}. Hence, M satisfies CC.
Next we show that M satisfies TP. Let x ∈ M(RN ). Then mx(RN ) ≤
my(RN ) for all y ∈ A. Consider a ranking R′ ∈ L such that t(R′) = x. Then
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mx(RN , R′) = mx(RN )− 1 and my(RN , R′) ≥ my(RN )− 1 for all y ∈ A \ {x}.
Hence mx(RN , R′) ≤ my(RN , R′) for all y ∈ A, so that x ∈M(RN , R′).
It remains to show thatM satisfies BP. Suppose x 6∈M(RN ). Choose y ∈ A
with mx(RN ) > my(RN ). Consider a ranking R′ ∈ L such that b(R′) = x.
Then mx(RN , R′) = mx(RN ) + 1 and my(RN , R′) ≤ my(RN ) + 1. Hence,
mx(RN , R′) > my(RN , R′), so that x /∈M(RN , R′). ¤
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Let RN ∈ LN and suppose that x = F (RN ) /∈
H(RN ). We derive a contradiction. Since x /∈ H(RN ), there is a y ∈ A such
that my(RN ) < mx(RN ) and nyx(RN ) ≥ my(RN ). If my(RN ) ≤ 0 then by CC
of F and Remark 2.1 either x = y or my(RN ) = mx(RN ) = 0, but each case
contradicts my(RN ) < mx(RN ). Therefore my(RN ) > 0. Hence, nyx(RN ) > 0.
Equivalently, nxy < 0, which implies that my(RN ) = nx˜y(RN ) for some x˜ ∈ A\
{x}, i.e., x does not have the maximal resistance against y at the profile RN . Let
R′ ∈ L such that xR′yR′z for all z ∈ A\{x, y}. Thenmx(RN , R′) = mx(RN )−1
and my(RN , R′) = my(RN )−1. Thus, we still have my(RN , R′) < mx(RN , R′),
and nyx(RN , R′) = nyx(RN ) − 1 ≥ my(RN ) − 1 = my(RN , R′). Therefore,
if we keep on adding the ranking R′, then nyx(RN , R′, . . . , R′) decreases but
still nyx(RN , R′, . . . , R′) ≥ my(RN , R′, . . . , R′). Hence, after adding my(RN )
rankings R′ we have my(RN , R′, . . . , R′) = 0 while mx(RN , R′, . . . , R′) >
my(RN , R′, . . . , R′). Hence C(RN , R′, . . . , R′) 6= ∅ but x /∈ C(RN , R′, . . . , R′), so
that by CC of F , x 6= F (RN , R′, . . . , R′). This violates TP of C. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Suppose that F satisfies IIA with respect to C. We
construct a ranking Q as in the proposition. First, take N1 ⊆ N and RN11 ∈ LN
1
such that C(RN
1
1 ) = A. Then let F (R
N1
1 )Qx for all x ∈ A \ {F (RN
1
1 )}. Next,
take N2 ⊆ N and RN22 ∈ LN
2
such that C(RN
2
2 ) = A \ {F (RN
1
1 )} and let
F (RN
2
2 )Qx for all x ∈ A\{F (RN
1
1 ), F (R
N2
2 )}. Continuing this way, we construct
a sequence RN
1
1 , . . . , R
N |A|−1
|A|−1 and a ranking Q ∈ L. Now let R˜M be an arbitrary
profile and write B = C(R˜M ). Let b ∈ B such that bQx for all x ∈ B. Then
let D = {x : bQx for all x ∈ A} and RNjj for some 1 ≤ j ≤ |A| − 1 such that
C(RN
j
j ) = D then, by construction of Q, F (R
Nj
j ) = b. By IIA, F (R˜
M ) = b.
This shows the only-if direction of the proposition.
For the if-direction, suppose there is a ranking Q ∈ L such that F (RN )Qx for
every profile RN and every x ∈ C(RN ). Suppose that RN and R˜M are profiles
with C(R˜M ) ⊆ C(RN ) and F (RN ) ∈ C(R˜M ). Then, since F (RN )Qx for all
x ∈ C(RN ), it follows that F (RN )Qx for all x ∈ C(R˜M ). Hence, F (RN ) =
F (R˜M ). ¤
Proof of the claims in Example 4.8 We first show that F¯ satisfies BP. Let
x ∈ A and RN ∈ LN such that F¯ (RN ) 6= x. Let R′ ∈ L with b(R′) = x. We
have to show that F¯ (RN , R′) 6= x. We will use the notation βz(R˜P ) = |{i ∈ P :
b(R˜i) = z}| for a profile R˜P and an alternative z ∈ A.
If x /∈ M¯(RN , R′) then F¯ (RN , R′) 6= x and we are done. Thus, we assume
x ∈ M¯(RN , R′). This implies, in particular, that x ∈ M(RN ), since otherwise
x /∈M(RN , R′), hence x /∈ M¯(RN , R′).
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Now suppose y ∈ M¯(RN ), y 6= x. Then my(RN , R′) ≤ my(RN ) + 1 =
mx(RN ) + 1 = mx(RN , R′), so that y ∈ M(RN , R′). Also, βy(RN ) ≤ βx(RN )
implies βy(RN , R′) = βy(RN ) < βx(RN ) + 1 = βx(RN , R′). This together
with y ∈ M(RN , R′) and x ∈ M¯(RN , R′) gives a contradiction. Therefore,
M¯(RN ) = {x}, which contradicts F¯ (RN ) 6= x.
To show, finally, that F¯ does not satisfy TP, we exhibit an example. Let
A = {a, b, c} and take Q = abc. Consider the 6-voter profile RN given by
2 2 2
a b c
b c a
c a b
Then M(RN ) = M¯(RN ) = {a, b, c} and F¯ (RN ) = a. For the 7-voter profile
(RN , R′) with R′ = acb:
2 2 2 1
a b c a
b c a c
c a b b
we obtain M(RN , R′) = M¯(RN , R′) = {a, c} and F¯ (RN , R′) = c, hence a
violation of TP. ¤
Proof of the claims in Example 4.9 We first prove TP of Fˇ . Let RN be a
profile with x = Fˇ (RN ) and let R′ ∈ L with t(R′) = x. We have to show that
Fˇ (RN , R′) = x.
If y ∈ A\M(RN ) then my(RN ) > mx(RN ), hence my(RN , R′) ≥ my(RN )−
1 > mx(RN )− 1 = mx(RN , R′), so that y /∈ M(RN , R′). Hence, M(RN , R′) ⊆
M(RN ).
We claim that Mˇ(RN , R′) ⊆ Mˇ(RN ). To prove this, let z ∈ A\Mˇ(RN ). We
show that z /∈ Mˇ(RN , R′). If z /∈ M(RN , R′), then z /∈ Mˇ(RN , R′) and we are
done. Now suppose z ∈ M(RN , R′), hence also z ∈ M(RN ) by the preceding
paragraph. If b(R′) = z then mz(RN , R′) = mz(RN ) + 1 = mx(RN ) + 1 >
mx(RN ) − 1 = mx(RN , R′), so that z /∈ M(RN , R′), a contradiction. Hence
b(R′) 6= z and therefore βz(RN , R′) = βz(RN ) < βx(RN ) = βx(RN , R′), where
the strict inequality follows from z ∈ M(RN ) \ Mˇ(RN ) (with β-notation as
in the preceding proof). Hence we have z ∈ M(RN , R′) \ Mˇ(RN , R′). This
concludes the proof of the claim.
Since x is the maximal element of Mˇ(RN ) according to ranking Q, the
above claim implies that it is also the maximal element of Mˇ(RN , R′) according
to ranking Q, and therefore Fˇ (RN , R′) = x, as was to be proved.
To show that Fˇ does not satisfy BP we exhibit the following example of a
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12-voter profile RN with set of alternatives A = {a, b, c, d, e}, and Q = abcde:
4 1 1 1 1 4
b b c c a a
e c d d c d
c d e e d e
d e b a e c
a a a b b b
Here, M(RN ) = Mˇ(RN ) = {a, b} and Fˇ (RN ) = a. Add a ranking R′ = cdeab
to obtain the profile (RN , R′) given by
4 1 1 2 1 4
b b c c a a
e c d d c d
c d e e d e
d e b a e c
a a a b b b
then Mˇ(RN , R′) = {b}, hence Fˇ (RN , R′) = b, which is a violation of BP. ¤
Proof of the claims in Example 4.10We first show that F satisfies BP. Due
to Proposition 3.2 we only have to consider cases in which (i) b is not chosen but
by adding a ranking with b at bottom we obtain profile R∗ and (ii) the cases in
which we add to R∗ a new ranking with bottom alternative a or c.
For (i) let N = {1, ..., 9} and first consider profile RN1 given by
3 3 3
a b c
b c a
c a b
Then M(RN1 ) = {a, b, c} and F (RN1 ) = b. Hence, this case cannot lead to a
violation of BP.
Next consider the profile RN2 as follows:
2 3 4
a b c
b c a
c a b
ThenM(RN2 ) = {c} and F (RN2 ) = c. Now R∗ is obtained by adding the ranking
R′ = abc but since b(R′) = c this does not lead to a violation of BP.
Now consider the following profile RN3 :
3 2 4
a b c
b c a
c a b
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Then M(RN3 ) = {c} and F (RN3 ) = c. Since R∗ is obtained by adding the
ranking R′ = bca, again this does not lead to a violation of BP.
For (ii), letN = {1, . . . , 10} and consider R∗, thus F (R∗) = b. Add a ranking
R′ with b(R′) = c. If bR′aR′c thenM(R∗, R′) = {a, b, c} and F (R∗, R′) = b 6= c.
If aR′bR′c then M(R∗, R′) = {a, c} and F (R∗, R′) = a 6= c. Since a /∈ {b, c} =
H(R∗) and H satisfies BP, we do not have to consider rankings R′ such that
b(R′) = a. We conclude that F satisfies BP.
Now we show TP of F . As in the case of BP, first consider 9-voter profiles
which may result in R∗ by adding a ranking. In the case of RN1 we have F (R
N
1 ) =
b and R∗ is obtained by adding the ranking R′ = cab, which does not violate
TP. For RN2 we have F (R
N
2 ) = c and R
∗ is obtained by adding the ranking
R′ = abc, which does not violate TP. For RN2 we have F (R
N
3 ) = c and R
∗ is
obtained by adding the ranking R′ = bca, again no violation of TP.
Finally, consider R∗ with F (R∗) = b. Adding the ranking R′ = bac results
in M(R∗, R′) = {a, b, c} and F (R∗, R′) = b, and adding the ranking R′ = bca
results in M(R∗, R′) = {b, c} and F (R∗, R′) = b, hence no violation of TP. All
other cases follow from Proposition 3.2. ¤
Proof of the claims in Example 4.11 Let R′ = abc. Then M(R∗, R′) =
{a, c}, hence F (R∗, R′) = c, which violates BP since F (R∗) = b.
The proof of TP of F is similar to the proof above for Example 4.10. We
have F (RN1 ) = b, so this cannot violate TP. For R
N
2 we have F (R
N
2 ) = c and
therefore adding R′ = abc to obtain R∗ cannot violate TP. For RN3 we have
F (RN3 ) = c and therefore adding R
′ = bca to obtain R∗ cannot violate TP
either. Considering R∗ and adding R′ = bac results in M(R∗, R′) = {a, b, c}
and F (R∗, R′) = b, which does not violate TP. Considering R∗ and adding
R′ = bca results in M(R∗, R′) = {b, c} and F (R∗, R′) = b, which again does not
violate TP. All other cases follow from Proposition 3.2. ¤
Proof of the claims in Example 4.12 A violation of TP is obtained by
adapting the profile used for this purpose in the proof of the claims in Example
4.8. (Another violation of TP can be obtained by adding the ranking R′ = bac
to R∗, since then F (R∗, R′) = a 6= b = F (R∗), see below.) In order to show
BP it is by the proof of the claims in Example 4.8 again sufficient to consider
the cases involving R∗. First, F (RN1 ) = b, which cannot lead to a violation of
BP. Second, F (RN2 ) = c, hence adding R
′ = abc to obtain R∗ does not lead to
a violation of BP. Third, F (RN3 ) = c, hence adding R
′ = bca to obtain R∗ does
not lead to a violation of BP. Finally, consider R∗ with F (R∗) = b. Adding a
ranking R′ with b(R′) = a will result in F (R∗, R′) = c; and adding a ranking R′
with b(R′) = c will result in F (R∗, R′) = a. Hence, no violations of BP occur. ¤
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